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**An Overdue Post-Cold War Army Structure**

**By**

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**A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College, Department of the Army, or the Department of the Navy.**

**Signature: \_\_\_\_\_**

**18 May 2004**

## **Abstract**

Over the past five years, the United States Army (USA) has taken significant actions to increase its readiness and relevance to Joint Force Commander (JFC). The Army has rapidly aligned itself with the Department of Defense (DoD) Transformation plan and is aggressively identifying and building required capabilities now in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The Army is conducting a significant reorganization on a scale of which has not been since the beginning of the Second World War. Central to this major reorganization is a shift from divisions to brigades as the centerpiece of tactical operations. Integral to reorganization is the creation of modular units. This paper will examine the Army's modular unit concept and how it will provide a more responsive and relevant capability for JFCs. Joint doctrine emphasizes integration and synchronization of the right team or joint force mix necessary to successfully accomplish assigned missions and achieve national security aims. The overall goal of the transformation effort is the creation of a joint force that dominates across the full spectrum of military operations. The modularity construct has been an integral aspect of the Army transformation strategy from the beginning and has become even more critical as the Army meets demands in support of the GWOT. A modular Army or the Future Force will provide the future JFC responsive and relevant capabilities through the full range of military operations.

## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>ARMY TRANSFORMATION &amp; MODULARITY</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>RESPONSIVE AND RELEVANT TO THE JFC</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>ARMY END STRENGTH REMAIN AN ISSUE</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>RECOMMENDATIONS</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>CONCLUSION</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	<b>22</b>

## **LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS**

<b>FIGURE</b>	<b>TITLE</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>JV 2020 FULL SPECTRUM DOMINANCE</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>ARMY GLOBAL COMMITMENTS</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>MODULAR CONSTRUCT OVERVIEW</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>FUTURE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>ARMY IMMEDIATE FOCUS AREAS</b>	<b>22</b>

## INTRODUCTION

“As long as the United States Army has existed we have transformed...and we always will. For four years under General Shinseki our Army has asked hard questions and made tough choices. We will continue to go where the answers to those questions take us. Our azimuth to the future is good. The Army must remain relevant and ready.”(GEN Schoomaker, 1 August 2003)

Over the past five years, the United States Army (USA) has taken significant actions to increase its readiness and relevance to Joint Force Commander (JFC). A substantial effort termed, “Army Transformation”, was begun in October 1999 when former Chief of Staff of the United States Army (CSA), General Eric K. Shinseki, published his vision for the Army. An initiative continued, and subsequently evolving, under the current CSA, General Peter J. Schoomaker. Started in a period of relative peace and continuing in the midst of a war, transformation of the USA is not without its critics. While there is general recognition that in today’s security environment the USA is too heavy and slow to rapidly deploy, there are an abundance of diverse opinions on how best to change the Army. Adding lingering memories of widely reported controversy between the Secretary of Defense and the Army’s senior leadership in the early months of the Bush Administration, “Army Transformation” remains an emotionally charged issue for many.<sup>1</sup> Despite the emotion and criticism, which are

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<sup>1</sup> Some experts consider this period of discord between Pentagon civilians and the Army's uniformed leadership the most serious civil-military breach since the post-World War II "Revolt of the Admirals" - when the Navy went public with its opposition to civilian plans to cut Navy funding and rely on the Air Force for all strategic nuclear capabilities - or later disagreements between former Defense Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs over Vietnam. Fallout from the battles between Rumsfeld's team and the Army led to the firing of Army Secretary White and the hiring of Air Force Secretary Roche to take White's place. The backdrop included an almost-unprecedented feud between senior civilians and then-CSA Gen. Shinseki over the pace of Army transformation; Rumsfeld's cancellation of the Army's new Crusader artillery system; and disputes over how many troops would be needed during and after the war in Iraq. It didn't help that Rumsfeld, by leaking the name of Shinseki's designated successor, essentially made the Army chief of staff a lame duck with more than a year left in his tour. Shinseki was eventually succeeded not by an active-duty general from the conventional Army - three of whom declined the job - but by retired Gen. Peter Schoomaker, who has a Special Forces background. Shinseki's departure was followed by a house-cleaning of three-star generals whom he had groomed. Taken from James Kitfield, “Army Troops, Budget Stretched to the Limit,” *National Journal*, September 8, 2003, [<http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0903/090803nj1.htm>] Accessed: 28 April 2004.

important elements in maintaining the integrity of any program, the Army has rapidly aligned itself with the Department of Defense (DoD) Transformation plan and is aggressively identifying and building required capabilities now in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

Army Transformation is an evolving process involving the Total Army which is striving to achieve enhanced capabilities in the Current Force as it transitions to the Future Force. Within this effort to enhance the Current Force with Future Force characteristics and capabilities, General Schoomaker established sixteen immediate focus areas (see appendix for complete list) to accelerate change in order to meet the demands of the GWOT while increasing the Army's readiness and relevance to the joint force. Of the sixteen initiatives, two, Active Component / Reserve Component Balance and Modularity, are responsible for the massive ongoing Army reorganization which is on a scale that has not been since the beginning of the Second World War.<sup>2</sup> Central to this major reorganization is a shift from divisions to brigades as the centerpiece of tactical operations. Integral to reorganization is the creation of modular units. This paper will examine the Army's modular unit concept and how it will provide a more responsive and relevant capability for JFCs. In particular, will restructuring the USA to modular, capabilities-based unit designs provide JFCs capabilities they can employ to achieve Full Spectrum Dominance described in Joint Vision 2020?

Joint doctrine emphasizes integration and synchronization of the right team or joint force mix necessary to successfully accomplish assigned missions and achieve national security aims. The JFC, whether a combatant commander (COCOM), sub-unified commander, or joint task force commander, is the given the authority and responsibility to

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<sup>2</sup> Army Department, Army 2003 Transformation Roadmap, (Washington, D.C.: December 2003, 1-2.

build the team and employ it.<sup>3</sup> A quotation from the capstone document of joint doctrine, Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, encapsulates the central philosophy necessary for successful joint operations - joint warfare is team warfare.<sup>4</sup>

The engagement of forces is not a series of individual performance linked by a common theme; rather, it is the integrated and synchronized application of all appropriate capabilities. The synergy that results from the operations of joint forces according to joint doctrine maximizes capability in unified action. Joint warfare does not require that all forces participate in a particular operation merely because they are available. The joint force commander has the authority and responsibility to tailor forces for the mission at hand, selecting those that most effectively and efficiently ensure success.<sup>5</sup>

Selection of appropriate forces in planning joint operations and campaigns is an essential aspect of the operational art employed by JFCs. In practice, since implementation of the Goldwaters-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act in 1986, JFCs have had varying degrees of success in tailoring joint forces for the desired synergistic effect. It is only recently in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) that some have credited the US military in achieving the most 'joint' operations ever conducted.

The joint warfare philosophy was evident in action and a joint team was critical to the success of JFCs in the initial phases of OEF and OIF. The combat phases of both operations exhibited a high level of joint interoperability as opposed to independent and de-conflicted operations. Using OIF as an example, when questioned about lessons learned in OIF during a DoD news briefing on 15 April 2003, Mr. Rumsfeld credited the overwhelming success in Iraq to effective joint team operations.

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<sup>3</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint Publication 0-2 (Washington, D.C.: 10 July 2001), I-5 – I-6.

<sup>4</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, D.C.: 14 November 2000), i.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, III-3 – III-4.



This was not a war (OIF) fought by the Army or the Navy or the Air Force. It was -- or the Marines. It was a war that's been fought by joint forces under excellent leadership. And there isn't any one service that could have done what was done. It was the force multiplier, the leverage that was achieved by the combined -- joint and combined effort between the United States and Great Britain and Poland and other countries. Therefore the lessons learned will be looked at not by service alone, but by the Joint Forces Command and others, who will do a very thorough job<sup>6</sup>

The unprecedented successes in the combat phases of both OIF and OEF are illustrative of the synergistic power of joint forces. With both operations far from over, it will be critical to consider lessons learned in post combat phases to best determine the appropriate capabilities for the future joint force. Indeed, one year later during another press conference in the middle of the deadliest month of the war for the US, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's public acknowledgement that he had not anticipated the (high) level of violence and the need to maintain high large numbers of ground forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan suggests the U.S. may not have fully achieved the Full Spectrum Dominance described in JV 2020 or if we have achieved it, then it must be recognized that in order to sustain it requires significant ground forces for an extend timeframe.<sup>7</sup>

The overall goal of the transformation effort is the creation of a joint force that dominates across the full spectrum of military operations. Full Spectrum Dominance means success in deterrence, stability operations, and war (See Figure 1). JV 2020 uses the following terms – persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict.<sup>8</sup> As borne out in recent conflicts, the aftermath of major combat operations can be just as important to the outcome of the war.

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<sup>6</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, DOD News conference, April 15, 2003, [<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2003/g030415-D-6570C.html>] Accessed 23 April 2004.

<sup>7</sup> Bradley Graham, "Rumsfeld Says He Underestimated Level of Violence in Iraq," Washington Post, (April 16, 2004), 11. [https://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/early Bird/Apr2004/e20040416276261.htm1](https://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/early%20Bird/Apr2004/e20040416276261.htm1).

<sup>8</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Vision 2020, (Washington, D.C.: June 2000), 1.



Figure 1 – JV 2020 Full Spectrum Dominance

In both Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom OIF), JFCs appropriately tailored joint forces which maximized capabilities in unified action and rapidly achieved initial national security objectives. Joint forces achieved Full Spectrum Dominance in the major combat phase of both operations. However, despite overwhelming U.S. technological advantages, a quick decisive victory (QDV) remains illusive. Both operations continue along with a requirement for large numbers of ground forces for extended periods. While not discounting the important contributions of both the air and sea components, the land components are the most heavily tasked with the United States Army providing the preponderance of forces in OIF and OEF. This situation has caused not only the widely politicized discussion questioning US actions in Iraq, but has also created significant challenges for the US Army. According to the 2004 Army Posture Statement:

In fiscal year (FY) 2003, “24 of the Army’s 33 Active Component Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), and five of our 15 Reserve Component Enhanced Separate Brigades (ESB) were deployed. This trend will continue in FY04,

with 26 of 33 Active Component BCTs and six of our 15 Reserve Component ESB brigades projected for deployment (See Figure 2).<sup>9</sup>




Figure 2 – Army Global Commitments

With over two-thirds of the Army's active duty combat brigades deployed overseas or in rotation from combat missions, it has taken significant actions to fulfill its Title 10 USC responsibility in providing trained and equipped forces in support of JFCs requirements in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to extended deployments for large numbers of guard and reserves along with enacting stop loss procedures to keep soldiers on active duty beyond their enlistment or duty obligation, it is conducting the earlier mentioned large scale reorganization. The importance of accelerating the modular reorganization to mitigating the risk associated with the extensive commitment of land forces in the GWOT cannot be overstated.

## ARMY TRANSFORMATION & MODULARITY


The modularity construct was an integral aspect of the Army transformation strategy under General Shinseki and has become more critical under General Schoomaker as the

<sup>9</sup> Army Department, 2004 Army Posture Statement, (Washington, D.C.: 5 February 2004), 9

Army accomplishes its mission in support of the GWOT. The Army's first modular unit, which has come to be known as the Striker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), was the centerpiece of "Army Transformation" under General Shinseki. With considerable support of Congress and OSD the first SBCT went from concept to deployment in a record time of four years and is currently conducting missions in northern Iraq. The second SBCT is not far behind with the third and fourth SBCT also rapidly progressing on an accelerated schedule. The SBCT have become a critical component of the current force while remaining an important part of testing for the future force. The SBCT, however, is no longer the centerpiece of "Army Transformation".

Army Transformation has significantly evolved over the past year to encompass the entire Army. Originally begun under the Clinton Administration with limited DoD guidance, the Bush Administration has provided ample guidance in the form of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), 2002 United States National Security Strategy (USNSS), Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG), Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC), and Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs). Published in December 2003 and aligned with the DoD transformation guidance, the Army Transformation Roadmap (ATR) contains an evolved transformation strategy which includes taking action to enhance Current Force capabilities while developing the Future Force. Building enhanced capabilities in the Current to Future Force construct include creating modular, capabilities-based units to "create smaller, faster, lighter, and more lethal Army forces for interdependent joint operations now and into the future".<sup>10</sup> While only a part of the extensive transformation strategy, building modular units constitutes a major action and illustrates the rapid pace at which the USA is transforming.

The Army's transformation of the Current Force to a standardized, modular Army (or Future Force) comprised of smaller, tailorable, capabilities-based units is already underway in earnest. It began with the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division shortly after it returned from Iraq last summer. Other units are already scheduled to begin reorganization including the 101<sup>st</sup> Air Assault Division and the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division.<sup>11</sup> As presently planned, the modular army will be based around the ten division structure. However, the division will not retain its position as the Army's largest tactical formation. Instead, the brigade will assume the role as the largest tactical formation in the Army and are being called units of action (UA) (Fig. 3). Seven unique divisional organizations along with 4 corps and 6 armies will be reorganized into a yet to be determined number of standardized modular units of employment (UE). At the ground maneuver brigade-level, eight different types of organizations will ultimately be reorganized into three standardized unit of action structures – armored, infantry, and Stryker. Further, each division or unit of employment will gain an additional ground maneuver unit of action in the reorganization. In addition, divisional aviation, artillery, and support brigades will be reorganize into support units of action.



<sup>10</sup> Army Department, Army 2003 Transformation Roadmap, (Washington, D.C.: December 2003), xi.

<sup>11</sup> Reginald Rogers, Army Changes from Divisions to Brigade Units of Action, TRADOC New Service, April 5, 2004 [http

### Figure 3 – Modular Construct Overview

The ongoing reorganization of 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division is the beginning brigade-level modular units of action or UAs conversion effort. The Army estimates it will increase the number of active component brigade-sized ground maneuver units from 33 to between 43 and 48 as a part of the transformation to a modular force. The reserve component will lose 3 brigade equivalent units ending up with 34 ground maneuver units of action. Both the active and reserve UA organizations will share the same structures.

Units of employment or UEs, replacing present division and higher level headquarters organizations, will consist of two modular variants, UEx and UEy, with specific levels of emphasis. Both the UEx and UEy will be designed to be modular command and control elements that can be tailored according <sup>12</sup> The UEx will provide the primary war fighting headquarters capability which will combine the functions of the current division and corps headquarters. The primary task of the UEx is to employ UAs. In major combat operations (MCOs), UEx will be under the operational control (OPCON) of the JFLCC. For smaller scale contingencies, the UEx may serve as the ARFOR for the JTF or under the OPCON of other component commands. In addition, the UEx may operate as a JTF headquarters with joint augmentation from the SJTFHQ.<sup>13</sup> The UEy will provide the operational headquarters for land forces. It will serve primarily as the Army Service Component Commander (ASCC) and there will be a UEy assigned to each Geographic or Regional Combatant Commander (RCC). In MCOs the UEy may serve as the JFLCC simultaneously as ASCC. Both the UEx

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<sup>12</sup> Army Department, White Paper Unit of Employment Operations, Version 3.0, Washington, D.C.: 20 March 2004), 12 - 14.

<sup>13</sup> The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has directed that all geographic combatant commanders establish a SJFHQ by 2005. It will provide a small core of permanent operational experts that, using advances in communications and collaborative planning tools, would afford a combatant commander a continuous planning capability that could be augmented as the situation dictates. It would provide the ability to rapidly form, deploy, and employ joint force early in a contingency. Taken from Gene Myers, "Concepts to Future Doctrine," Common Perspective, April 2002, 8.

and UEy will be self sustained, modular, headquarters that do not rely on augmentation from subordinate units.

Army Transformation is not without its critics. There are many retired general opposed to it. According to LTG (R) Terry Scott, director of national security programs at Harvard University's School of Government, "Right now, for instance, there are a lot of retired generals who are happy to tell you that Army transformation is a lot of bull".<sup>14</sup> A commonly held belief is a large, robust Army deters others from challenging us. Many concerns with transformation revolve around belief that the Defense Secretary ultimately intends to cut Army force structure. Of the services the Army is the most vulnerable to losing force structure because cutting troop strength yields immediate and substantial cost savings and the Army has the least political constituency in Washington.<sup>15</sup> This is further exacerbated by the fact that roughly one American in 200 is on active military duty – the lowest proportion in a century.<sup>16</sup> Clearly, for the time being, with the high demand for ground forces in OIF and OEF, the likelihood of cutting force structure is unlikely. Indeed, many argue additional force structure is necessary to not only to meet the demands of OEF and OIF, but to sustain the goals and objectives of the current USNSS.

Another criticism of transformation - the push for a modular army - is while there will be an increased the number of brigade equivalent units or UAs, they will have less combat power than today's maneuver brigade. Many are concerned that the Army is assuming too much risk which could have serious repercussions against a more capable enemy. Andrew Krepinevich, a retired Army LTC and director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary

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<sup>14</sup> James Kitfield, "Army Shell Shocked in Face of Rumsfeld Reforms," National Journal, (11 June 2001) 2-3. <http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0601/0601101nj1.htm>. Accessed: May 10, 2004.

<sup>15</sup> Kitfield, 2.

Assessments, cautions those who believe Rumsfeld was vindicated by the initial successes in OEF and OIF using relatively lean ground forces backed by precision air power:

I would caution that the Iraqi military was really a pretty hapless opponent, and that Arab militaries in general have suffered a series of spectacular one-sided defeats going back to the 1940s. There are many questions central to the need to transform our military that were just not answered by these conflicts, and in Iraq many things occurred that could be the result of our ingenuity or their incompetence. We just don't know.<sup>17</sup>

Further, some military leaders are concerned that wrong conclusions are being drawn given the fact that more robust Army brigades within the present division structure under a corps as a part of a joint operation won the combat phase of the war. In addition, evidenced in Iraq everyday, boots on the ground is of critical importance. A brigade-sized force with less troops and enhanced technology may likely be less capable in stability operations such as those ongoing in OIF.

Army Transformation is not without risks. It does, however, better address the realities of today's uncertain security environment within the context of the requirements associated with the Nation's security strategy. With the notable exceptions of Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, the Army has been involved in a significantly greater number of less than division-size deployments – Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. During a recent Army briefing to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), it was reported that the Army has deployed forces in support of over 59 significant operations since 1989. In meeting the requirements for ongoing as well as future operations, the UA offers several distinct advantages over a present day division with brigade combat teams (BCTs). First, the unit of action is essentially a self-sustaining force which will be

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<sup>16</sup> James Fallows, "The Hollow Army," *The Atlantic Monthly*, (March 2004), 3. <http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2004/03/fallows.htm>. Accessed: 17 April 2004.



capable of fighting an enemy on its own for up to 72 hours.<sup>18</sup> As a result, an UA will be able to train, prepare, and deploy without the assistance of the divisional resources. Second, the standardization of UAs throughout the Army will allow greater strategic flexibility in deployment options as well as sustaining a forward presence under the evolving Joint Presence and Global Posture Realignment initiatives.<sup>19</sup> While achieving a minimum of two units at home for every one deployed may not be attainable in the near future considering the current force requirements for OIF and OEF, establishing a workable rotation schedule with standardized UAs in later years seems very feasible. Third, the smaller size and ability of the UA operate on a distributed, non-linear battlefield, requires integration with other joint forces to achieve desired effects. While assuming some risk the next few years, when the UA is combined with the flexibility offered by the unit of employment headquarters, a modularly organized Army will provide JFC responsive and relevant land force capabilities, completely interoperable with other joint forces, necessary to achieve full spectrum dominance.

### **RESPONSIVE AND RELEVANT TO THE JFC**

Joint Force Commanders are responsible for the planning and employment of joint forces throughout the range of military operations in order to accomplish the objectives directed by the National Command Authority (NCA). Employing operational art within the strategic direction provided by the NCA, JFCs develop campaigns and operations to gain victory in war, as well as achieving success across the full range of military operations (see

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<sup>17</sup> James Kitfield, "Army Troops, Budget Stretched to the Limit," *National Journal*, (September 8, 2003), 3. <http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0903/090803nj1.htm>. Accessed: 28 April 2004.

<sup>18</sup> Remarks from MG Webster, CG, 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division contained in article by Mick Walsh, "Webster Discusses Army of the Future at Benning – Changes Likely to Include Brigade Integration, Basic Training Overhaul," *Columbus (GA) Ledger-Enquirer*, (March 26, 2004), 2. [http://147.248.250.93/pao/Web\\_specials/FocusAreas/WebsteronArmymakeover.htm](http://147.248.250.93/pao/Web_specials/FocusAreas/WebsteronArmymakeover.htm) Accessed: 11 May 2004.

Figure 4).<sup>20</sup> The JFC has the authority and responsibility to tailor forces for the mission at hand, selecting those that most effectively and efficiently ensure success.<sup>21</sup> Total effectiveness of the joint force is the goal. It is not necessary to use all forces or to equally apportion forces. Forces that are the most relevant and responsive in accomplishing the mission should be employed. For the force of the future, JFCs will achieve NCA objectives through full spectrum dominance. A modular Army will provide the future JFC responsive and relevant capabilities through the full range of military operations.

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS			
Military Operations		General US Goals	Examples
COMBAT	War	Fight & Win	Large Scale Combat Operations Attack / Defend / Blockade
	NONCOMBAT	Deter War & Resolve Conflict	Peace Enforcement Counterterrorism Show of Force / Raid / Strike Peacekeeping / NEO Nation Assistance Counterinsurgency
		Promote Peace & Support US Civil Authorities	Freedom of Navigation Counterdrug Humanitarian Assistance Protection of Shipping US Civil Support

Figure 4 – Range of Military Operations

In major combat operations, a modular Army will continue to provide relevant and ready land force capability to ensure future JFCs achieve victory on the battlefield. The modular construct does not preclude the Army from winning large scale combat operations on a high intensity battlefield. The Army will retain the best of its current capabilities and attributes as it reorganizes to smaller, capabilities-based, modular forces. The Future Force

<sup>19</sup>James Kitfield, "Promises, Not Presence," *National Journal*, (April 2, 2004), 2-3. <http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0404/040304nj1.htm>. Accessed: 10 May 2004.

<sup>20</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *Joint Vision 2020*, (Washington, D.C.: June 2000), 6.

<sup>21</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: 10 September 2001) I-1.

(modular Army) will enhance and enable full spectrum dominance via interdependent joint operations that simultaneously attacks enemy centers of gravity on a distributed, non-linear battlefield in a relatively short period of time. It will be more rapidly deployable. Units of action, capable of fighting an enemy on its own for up to 72 hours, will reduce the logistics footprint. Figure 5 illustrates the evolving joint operational concept for the Future Force in a major combat operation.




Figure 5 – Future Operational Concept

It is in the military operations other than war where the Army's modular force construct or Future Force has significant improvement over the Current Force in meeting JFCs force requirements. The attributes the Future Force will greatly enhance the Army's readiness and relevance to the joint force. Modularity will provide JFCs scalable, ready forces that are more rapidly deployable. The standardized organizations will allow for more rapid identification of capabilities in crisis action situations. The self-contained characteristic of the modular unit will allow for more streamlined operations without excessive augmentation. The Future Force's modular unit construct will greatly increase the

responsiveness and strategic flexibility of the Army to meet JFC requirements for MOOTW while sustaining the means to conduct major combat operation and thereby sustaining the “only reliable guarantor of US vital interests”.<sup>22</sup>

The unit of employment will afford much greater capability to the JFC in MOOTW. Modular units of employment will eliminate the present day requirement to create ad hoc organizations for lesser contingencies like Somalia, Allied Force, and others. Linking UEy headquarters with each Regional Combatant Commander will greatly enhance coordination and response for all the joint operating concepts – major combat operations, stability operations, strategic deterrence, and homeland security. Serving as the ASCC, the UEy is responsible for ADCON of all Army forces in the AOR as well as integrates Army forces into theater engagement plans and provides support to joint forces, interagency elements, and multinational forces as directed by the RCC.<sup>23</sup> A significant improvement of the UEy over the present day ASCC organization will be its tailorable, self-contained, rapidly deployable capabilities.

The unit of action also offers a significant increase in land power capability in MOOTW. A greater number of smaller, self-supporting, modular brigade equivalent units of action will provide a much more rapid response to lesser contingencies which have historically been less than division-sized operations since 1989. Further, with a greater number of available standardized units, the Army will better be able to sustain a forward presence under the evolving Joint Presence and Global Posture Realignment initiatives. This will serve to strengthen the JFCs ability to deter potential adversaries while not adversely

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<sup>22</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, D.C.: 14 November 2000), IV-4.

<sup>23</sup> Army Department, White Paper Unit of Employment Operations, Version 3.0, Washington, D.C.: 20 March 2004), 52.

detracting from the readiness of the Army. With the exception of a current situation that exists today with a large commitment of ground forces to Iraq for stability operations, the Future Force will possess sufficient units to sustain a train, prepare, and deploy rotation of forces in support of maintenance of forward presence. Finally, just as in combat operations, the self supporting aspect of the UA greatly reduces the logistics footprint which serves to decrease number of supporting forces necessary to deploy. The significance of this is substantial in that the larger the deployed force structure the greater the force protection requirement. Further, force protection requirements for large logistics bases are much more challenging to execute due to their greater vulnerability to attack.

### **ARMY END STRENGTH REMAINS AN ISSUE**

Army Transformation is now inextricably linked defense transformation. Exploiting and applying new approaches, technologies, and new organizational structures within the Current Force will greatly enhance the Army's capabilities in meeting JFCs requirements for all proposed joint operation concepts. However, defense transformation may not effectively reflect the requirements for large scale stability operations (SASO). As seen in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the Army must take into account the extensive ground force requirements for SASO when developing force requirements for the future. The defense transformation greatly emphasizes the use of technology as a substitute for massed forces. While recent combat operations in OIF exhibited a high degree of effectiveness with relatively small ground forces using precision airpower strikes, it would be prudent to consider 12 years of preparation that occurred before commencement of ground of the latest

operation in evaluating the operation.<sup>24</sup> The extension of 20,000 soldiers in Iraq for at least three additional months beyond their year long deployment serves as a warning that boots on the ground may have greater impact than any technological advances when it comes to a major SASO. Plenty has been written in the open media about the over-extension of the Army. Given that experts who have studied how the dynamic of overstressed troops, inadequate funds and rapid change turned the U.S. Army of the 1970s into a “hollow force” warn of a repeat in today’s Army, it is important to ensure the future size of the Army adequately corresponds to the requirements of an aggressive security strategy.<sup>25</sup> The other alternative is reducing force requirements through the realignment of forces deployed overseas. However, this alternative is at odds with the currently successful forward presence construct. Intangible benefits may be lost by shifting significant forces and reducing military presence in Europe and Asia that counter any potential gains.<sup>26</sup> While recognizing the high costs with increasing the size of the Army, for example each additional soldier adds an additional \$50,000 to \$100,000 to the defense budget, if, sustaining forward presence and large scale stability operations are to remain key to the nation’s security strategy, then a larger Army is necessary.<sup>27</sup> Reorganization alone will not generate sufficient additional deployable forces to meet JFCs demands for SASO now and into the future. Additional force structure will be required.

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<sup>24</sup> The coordinating draft of JFCOM Lessons Learned for OIF (1 March 2004) provides greater explanation for the success of US Armed Forces during major combat operations. While dominate maneuver and overmatching fires of joint forces overwhelmed the Iraqi military, one should not discount the 12 years the US had to prepare itself and further weaken Iraq prior to commencement of OIF. U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Lessons Learned Operation Iraqi Freedom Major Combat Operations (Coordinating Draft), 7-15. (Norfolk, VA: 1 March 2004).

<sup>25</sup> James Kitfield, “Army Troops, Budget Stretched to the Limit,” National Journal, (September 8, 2003), 3. <http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0903/090803nj1.htm>. Accessed: 28 April 2004

<sup>26</sup> James Kitfield, “Promises, Not Presence,” National Journal, (April 2, 2004), 2-3. <http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0404/040304nj1.htm>. Accessed: 10 May 2004

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The Services must work together on new joint doctrine, developing future military equipment, and conducting joint exercises to continue to improve upon the “joint-ness” exhibited during recent combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Army Transformation appears to be generating greater ties between services. In its effort to accelerate its reorganization of the Current Force to a Future Force construct (modular force), the USAF and USMC have announced initiatives which will serve to strengthen the joint force. Spurred by close air support (CAS) operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Services are working together to establish a Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC).<sup>28</sup> The Stryker and UA will be very reliant on tactical air support – especially on a distributed, non-linear battlefield. In March, the USMC announced they have joined with the Army to develop the Future Combat System.<sup>29</sup> Further, increasing use of joint exercises will also foster benefits for the joint force now and into the future. The second annual joint exercise between the Army and U.S. Joint Forces Command was conducted the first week of May.<sup>30</sup> Among the many benefits participating in joint exercises is examining how the joint force can best accomplish objectives within the construct of future joint operations concepts. With the Marine Corps and Army heavily committed throughout the globe, it is important to sustain

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<sup>27</sup> James Fallows, “The Hollow Army,” The Atlantic Monthly, (March 2004), 4. <http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2004/03/fallows.htm>. Accessed: 17 April 2004

<sup>28</sup> Michael Sirak, “Back to the Future,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (April 21, 2004), 1.

<sup>29</sup> Christian Lowe, “Corps, Army Team Up to Develop New Family of Fighting Vehicles,” Marine Corps Times, (March 29, 2004), 16.

<sup>30</sup> Lorie Jewell, “Unified Quest 04 Focuses on Joint Capabilities,” Army News Service, (10 May 2004), 1-2, [http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/print.php?story\\_id\\_key=5942](http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/print.php?story_id_key=5942). Accessed: 11 May 2004.

initiatives that continue to emphasize “joint-ness” as accomplishing the SASO mission will more likely generate an “inward” service focus.

## **CONCLUSION**

The USA has taken significant actions to restructure mitigate force management risk and increase its readiness and relevance to Joint Force Commander (JFC). The Army has taken overdue action to begin to transform a Cold War Army Structure to meet the challenges of tomorrow. No longer focusing on a single, well-defined threat or a geographic region, it is developing a range of complementary and interdependent capabilities that will enable future joint force commanders to dominate any adversary or situation. Adopting the capabilities-based approach to concept and force development, as articulated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Army has already begun restructuring the Current Force into modular units as well as adjusting the mix between AC and RC force structure.<sup>31</sup> Both initiatives will significantly enhance the Army's ability to provide JFCs relevant and ready land power capability. Army Transformation is achieving the vision addressed in the USNSS in a much accelerated manner.

A military structured to deter massive Cold War-era armies must be transformed to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might occur. ... We must prepare for more such deployments (Afghanistan) by developing assets such as advanced remote sensing, long-range precision strike capabilities, and transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces. This broad portfolio of military capabilities must also include the ability to defend the homeland, conduct information operations, ensure U.S. access to distant theaters, and protect critical U.S. infrastructure and assets in outer space.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Army Department, 2004 Army Posture Statement, (Washington, D.C.: February 5, 2004), Introduction.

<sup>32</sup> USNSS 29 - 30



Army Transformation is an evolving process involving the Total Army which will enhance the capabilities in the Current Force as it transitions to the Future Force. Within a few short years, the Current Force as we know it today will be transformed into a future-like force with increased capabilities for the JFC. However, exploiting new approaches, technologies, and new organizational structures will be unable to generate the “boots on the ground” needed to sustain the requirement for large numbers of land forces in support of ongoing and future stability operations. Army officials are already warning that by the end of next year, over 45,000 soldiers may be forced to conduct back-to-back deployments.<sup>33</sup> The modular unit concept is essential to ensuring the Army is ready and relevant combat power to the JFC now and into the future.

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<sup>33</sup> Esther Schrader, “Tradition Left in the Dust as Army Reinvents Itself,” Los Angeles Times (24 March 2004),

## **Appendix – Army Transformation Immediate Focus Areas (Figure 6)**

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1, <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/iraq/complete/la-fg-army/24mar24,0,5102950.story?coll=la=iraq-complete>.

# Immediate Focus Areas

The Senior Leadership of the Army has established the following immediate focus areas to channel Army efforts on winning the Global War on Terrorism and increasing the relevance and readiness of the Army.

The Focus Areas are:

- **The Soldier** – Develop flexible, adaptive and competent Soldiers with a Warrior Ethos.
- **The Bench** – Prepare future generations of senior leaders. Identify and prepare select Army leaders for key positions within joint, interagency, multinational and Service organizations.
- **Combat Training Centers/Battle Command Training Program** – Focus training at CTC and BCTP to meet requirements of current security context, and Joint and Expeditionary team.
- **Leader Development and Education** – Train and educate Army members of the Joint Team.
- **Army Aviation** – Conduct a holistic review of Army Aviation and its role on the Joint battlefield.
- **Current to Future Force** – Accelerate fielding of select Future Force capabilities to enhance effectiveness of Current Force. Army transformation is part of constant change.
- **The Network** – Leverage and enable interdependent, network-centric warfare.
- **Modularity** – Create modular, capabilities-based unit designs.
- **Joint and Expeditionary Mindset** – Retain our campaign qualities while developing a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset.
- **Active Component /Reserve Component Balance** – Redesign the force to optimize the active and reserve component (AC/RC) mix across the defense strategy.
- **Force Stabilization** – Ensure unit stability and continuity, and provide predictability to Soldiers and their families.
- **Actionable Intelligence** – Provide situational understanding to Commanders and Soldiers with the speed, accuracy and confidence to impact current and future operations.
- **Installations as Flagships** – Enhance Installation ability to project power and support families.
- **Authorities, Responsibilities, and Accountability** – Clarify roles and enable agile decision-making.
- **Resource Processes** – Redesign resource processes to be flexible, responsive and timely.
- **Strategic Communications** – Tell the Army Story so that the Army's relevance and direction are clearly understood and supported.

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